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CC clawapi-manager

OpenClaw API management and cost optimization. Manages multi-provider keys, monitors costs, routes tasks intelligently, and provides automated failover. Use when managing API keys, tracking costs, or optimizing API spending. Triggers: "api key", "cost", "budget", "provider", "validate config", "fix config".

ClawHub Agent Skills author: 2233admin v1.1.2 48 files · 11 scripts body ≈ 1 306 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 50/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationGitHubSoftware developmentInfrastructureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
61/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
50
Quality 40%
78
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
50/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 14

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 14
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use auto_rotate.sh:34
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s -X POST "https://api.telegram.org/bot${TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN}/sendMessage" \
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use check_cost.sh:55
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s -X POST "https://api.telegram.org/bot${TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN}/sendMessage" \
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use check_quota.sh:39
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s -X POST "https://api.telegram.org/bot${TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN}/sendMessage" \
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence install.sh:51
      Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
      echo "3. (Optional) Install cron: cp ${SCRIPT_DIR}/cron.example /etc/cron.d/api-cockpit"
      code literal
    • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key lib/antigravity.py:16
      Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
      API key + configurable base URL from environment
    • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key lib/codex.py:16
      Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
      API key + configurable base URL from environment
    • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key lib/copilot.py:16
      Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
      API key + configurable base URL from environment
    • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url lib/notifier.py:38
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      url = f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{bot_token}/sendMessage"
      quoted
    • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key lib/windsurf.py:16
      Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
      API key + configurable base URL from environment
    • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url auto_rotate.sh:34
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
      curl -s -X POST "https://api.telegram.org/bot${TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN}/sendMessage" \
      placeholder
    • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url check_cost.sh:55
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
      curl -s -X POST "https://api.telegram.org/bot${TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN}/sendMessage" \
      placeholder
    • low Exfiltration read-dotenv check_quota.sh:18
      Reads a .env file (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      echo "Error: ${CONFIG_DIR}/.env not found. Copy .env.example and configure it."
      quoted
    • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url check_quota.sh:39
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
      curl -s -X POST "https://api.telegram.org/bot${TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN}/sendMessage" \
      placeholder
    • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal claw_api_manager_central.py:63
      Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
      api_key = sys.argv[4]

    Files scanned: 48. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • warning frontmatter-yaml SKILL.md: the frontmatter is not valid YAML (YAML parse error: Nested mappings are not allowed in compact mappings at line 5, column 14: description: OpenClaw API management and cost optimization. Manages multi-provi… ^ ); fields were read line by line. The usual cause is a colon inside an unquoted value
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "slug"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 50/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 44 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1306 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 5 example trigger phrases
    • +3Description length 308: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 23 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 44 items
    • +4Has examples (12 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 78.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill is broadly aligned with API management, but its handling of API keys, local config changes, alerts, and daemon restarts needs careful review before use.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 28 May 2026