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BB cardano-staking

Check stake delegation and available ADA rewards for the connected wallet.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Angelos Kappos v1.0.0 MIT-0 5 files body ≈ 147 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process B 67/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, failures and branches, progress reporting

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
81/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
85
Quality 40%
74
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
67/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 3

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 3
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:20
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      Risk: The skill requires a wallet seed phrase through the associated MCP package even though the described task is a read-only rewards lookup. <br>
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:21
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      Mitigation: Do not provide a real seed phrase unless the MCP package has been audited and trusted; prefer a read-only public stake address or equivalent method where available. <br>
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:22
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      Risk: A seed phrase can control wallet funds if exposed to an untrusted dependency or runtime. <br>

    Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 67/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 8 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 147 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Description length 74: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +4No input/output examples
    • -42 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Structure: 5 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 8 items
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 74.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This staking checker is narrowly described, but it asks for a wallet seed phrase to perform a read-only rewards lookup.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026