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AB astrobrowse-authenticated-agentic-browser

AstroBrowse - Authenticated Agentic Browser: Operate a real, authenticated web browser on the user's. Use when an agent needs astrobrowse authenticated agentic browser, astrobrowse authenticated agentic browser, post and schedule content across social media accounts, pull reports and update records in crms and erps, operate saas platforms and portals that have no api, fill and submit web forms on the user's behalf, close browser, browser session id through AgentPMT-hosted remote tool calls.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: AgentPMT v1.0.0 MIT-0 3 files body ≈ 4 144 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 35 h ago

AstroBrowse - Authenticated Agentic Browser: Operate a real, authenticated web browser on the user's.

As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, running it twice

IntegrationAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
94/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
100
Quality 40%
86
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
68/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
Tools and files w 18
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 0

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4144 tokens
    • 100Steps. 81 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 3 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 495: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 18 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 81 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill is a coherent authenticated browser integration, but it can take real actions in logged-in accounts and persist session artifacts without a clear per-action consent model.
    LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 11 Aug 2026