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AB edgeone skill scanner

Scan any agent skill for security risks before you install or use it. Powered by Tencent Zhuque Lab A.I.G (AI-Infra-Guard). 100% local static analysis — no file contents or credentials leave your device. Compatible with CodeBuddy, Cursor, Windsurf, Claude Code, OpenClaw and more. Triggers on: `这个 skill 安全吗`, `skill 安全扫描`, `检查 skill 安全`, `audit skill`, `scan skill`, `check skill safety`, `analyze skill`, `inspect skill`, `verify skill`, `skill security`, `skill supply chain`. Do NOT trigger for general agent usage, full system health checks, project debugging, or normal development.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: aigsec v1.0.4 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 3 448 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process B 69/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, consistency, progress reporting

AnalyzerAI and agentsSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
91/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
99
Quality 40%
78
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
69/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Consistency w 8
40
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:179
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Credential exfiltration, trojan or downloader behavior, reverse shell, backdoor, persistence,

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "auth"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "keywords"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "triggers"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 69/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (edgeone skill scanner) differs from the folder (edgeone-skill-scanner)
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 100Steps. 54 steps
    • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
    • 100Failures and branches. 9 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3448 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • -245 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 588: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 26 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 54 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 78.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill set is mostly coherent, but one review helper defaults to launching a nested agent with full-access sandbox bypass.
    LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026