SKILLEMALL.ai

BC chrome-devtools-mcp

Use Chrome DevTools MCP for safe, configurable browser automation, page inspection, debugging, screenshots, network inspection, and performance analysis.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: itinai v1.0.1 MIT-0 15 files body ≈ 2 462 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 20 h ago

Use Chrome DevTools MCP for safe, configurable browser automation, page inspection, debugging, screenshots, network inspection, and performance analysis.

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

AnalyzerAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
83/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
89
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Instruction override medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The text contains phrases like "ignore previous instructions" or "you are now…". That is an attempt to hijack the agent: it may break your rules, the system limits or company policy.

For the author

An honest skill does not need them: state the role and the rules directly without overriding other instructions. Otherwise catalog scanners and corporate filters will block the listing.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 3

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 3
    • medium Instruction override en-ignore-previous scripts/validate_skill.py:47
      Instruction-override phrase ("ignore previous instructions") (detector / deny-list definition)
      "ignore previous instructions",
      detector
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell scripts/validate_skill.py:50
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (string literal in code, not executed)
      "curl | bash",
      code literal
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/skillspector.md:31
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (test fixture / example file)
      privilege escalation
      fixture

    Files scanned: 15. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 11 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 50 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2462 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • -46 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 153: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 14 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 50 items
    • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.

    External checks

    ClawHub: clean
    This skill is a transparent Chrome DevTools MCP policy wrapper with browser-control risks that are disclosed, configurable, and aligned with its purpose.
    LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 23 Jun 2026