CC camofox-default-browser
Advanced browser automation via Camoufox Firefox fork — handles anti-bot protection for authorized automation tasks
Advanced browser automation via Camoufox Firefox fork — handles anti-bot protection for authorized automation tasks
As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 10
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high Exfiltration
intent-browser-credential-storeREADME.md:150Accesses a browser credential / cookie store- Crash telemetry is anonymized: no page content, cookies, tokens, IPs, or user data
Medium and low: 9
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-shell-rcINSTALL.md:93Writes to a shell startup fileecho 'export CAMOUFOX_EXECUTABLE=/root/.cache/camoufox/camoufox' >> ~/.bashrc
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-hostINSTALL.md:168Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)RUN curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_20.x | bash - \
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-shell-rcINSTALL.md:297Writes to a shell startup filesed -i '/export CAMOUFOX_EXECUTABLE/d' ~/.bashrc
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low Dangerous commands
cmd-background-processINSTALL.md:133Starts a background / autostarted processnohup node server.js --port 9377 > /tmp/camofox-daemon.log 2>&1 &
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low Dangerous commands
cmd-background-processINSTALL.md:134Starts a background / autostarted processdisown
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low Dangerous commands
cmd-background-processscripts/startup.sh:15Starts a background / autostarted processnohup node server.js --port 9377 > /tmp/camofox-daemon.log 2>&1 &
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low Dangerous commands
cmd-background-processscripts/startup.sh:16Starts a background / autostarted processdisown
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low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSECURITY.md:31Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)Set file permissions 600 (owner only) chmod 777 for convenience
security skill -
low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalSECURITY.md:165Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)apikey="sk-a…456" # EXPOSED IN VERSION CONTROL
Files scanned: 14. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "homepage"
Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 23 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2533 tokens
- high The skill tells the model to perform an irreversible action with no human approval
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 115: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
- -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 14 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 23 items
- +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.