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Argument-driven prediction markets on Base. You bet USDC on debate outcomes by making compelling arguments. GenLayer's Optimistic Democracy consensus — a panel of AI validators running different LLMs — evaluates reasoning quality and determines winners. Better arguments beat bigger bets.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: albert-mr v1.1.0 4 files body ≈ 7 180 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 64/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers

AnalyzerInfrastructureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
58/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
56
Quality 40%
61
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
64/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Tools and files w 18
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  3. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 11

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell skill.md:87
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    curl -L https://foundry.paradigm.xyz | bash
Medium and low: 10
  • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump heartbeat.md
    Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (1) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
    heartbeat.md
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill.md:49
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    ├── .privkey         # Wallet private key (hex with 0x prefix)
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill.md:57
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    Your wallet private key (hex string with `0x` prefix). Used to sign all transactions.
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill.md:860
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    | `.privkey` | Wallet private key | **Lose wallet access permanently** |
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token heartbeat.md:7
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    metadata: {"chain":"base","chain_id":8453,"factory":"0xf9…537","usdc":"0x83…913","rpc":"https://mainnet.base.org"}
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token skill.md:6
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    metadata: {"chain":"base","chain_id":8453,"factory":"0xf9…537","usdc":"0x83…913","rpc":"https://mainnet.base.org"}
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token skill.md:150
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    cast call 0x83…913 \
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token skill.md:166
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    cast send 0x83…913 \
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token skill.md:168
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    0xf9…537 \
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token skill.md:231
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)
    | DebateFactoryCOFI | `0xf9…537` |
    table

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 7180 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 64/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 7180 tokens
  • 100Steps. 94 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 15 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 22 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 288: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 64 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 94 items
  • +4Has examples (41 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 61.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a real-money blockchain betting skill with disclosed purpose, but it gives mutable remote instructions ongoing control over a wallet-enabled agent and uses broad financial permissions.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 10 Sept 2026