SKILLEMALL.ai

BC traecli

TRAE CLI installation, configuration and usage guide. TRAE CLI is an AI-powered CLI programming assistant supporting natural language driven development.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: AlexJu v1.0.2 1 file body ≈ 3 586 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 61/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
94
Quality 40%
71
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
61/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 2
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash(*), Write(*), Edit(*)
    allowed-tools: Bash(*) Read(*) Write(*) Edit(*)
  • low Broad scope meta-dynamic-shell SKILL.md:276
    Shell command executed automatically when the skill loads (Claude Code !`cmd` preamble)
    !`command` is used to execute the specified command and insert its standard output result directly into the current position as text content.

Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "read_when"

Process rating: all ten parameters 61/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (traecli) differs from the folder (openclaw-traecli)
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 69 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 4 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3586 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 153: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 30 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 69 items
  • +4Has examples (11 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This TRAE CLI guide is coherent, but it asks users to run powerful remote installer and command-execution workflows without enough safety guardrails.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026