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CC Android应用商店部署工具

一个帮助开发者设置自动化Google Play商店部署流程的工具，支持项目分析、密钥生成、服务账户配置和GitHub Actions工作流生成。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: ALinkLab v1.0.1 MIT-0 7 files body ≈ 3 022 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 21 h ago

一个帮助开发者设置自动化Google Play商店部署流程的工具，支持项目分析、密钥生成、服务账户配置和GitHub Actions工作流生成。

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureGitHubSoftware developmentInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
70/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
72
Quality 40%
67
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 8

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 8
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:59
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    | Generate a new Android keystore file for app signing with secure parameters
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:199
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    keystore_path: Path to keystore file
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:201
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    store_password: Keystore password
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:244
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    工具描述：Generate a new Android keystore file for app signing with secure parameters
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:462
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    keystore_path: Path to keystore file
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets scripts/tools.py:47
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    Generate a new Android keystore file for app signing with secure parameters
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets scripts/tools.py:371
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    keystore_path: Path to keystore file
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets scripts/tools.py:373
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    store_password: Keystore password
    quoted

Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 14 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (Android应用商店部署工具) differs from the folder (hitoshura25-android-playstore-deploy)
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 20 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3022 tokens
  • low 16 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 72: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 27 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 20 items
  • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
  • +3All 4 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 67.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill appears to be a remote Android deployment helper, but it asks for and transmits high-value deployment credentials with weak disclosure and some mismatched documentation.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 9 Jul 2026