BC onemolt
Verified molt swarms - cryptographically prove your identity with Ed25519 signatures and WorldID proof-of-personhood. Register with services and verify unique human operators.
As a process C 60/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, consistency
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-shell-rcREADME.md:351Writes to a shell startup fileecho 'export IDENTITY_SERVER="https://onemolt.ai"' >> ~/.bashrc
-
medium Exfiltration
net-credential-usescripts/identity-proof.sh:299Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)local response=$(curl -sL -w "\n%{http_code}" "${server}/api/v1/register/${session_token}/status")
Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
Process rating: all ten parameters 60/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (onemolt) differs from the folder (one-molt)
- 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 19 steps
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 563 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 175: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 10 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 19 items
- +4Has examples (4 code blocks)
- +3All 2 scripts are documented
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.