SKILLEMALL.ai

C gpu-cli

Safely run local `gpu` commands via a guarded wrapper (`runner.sh`) with preflight checks and budget/time caps.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Angus Bezzina v1.2.0 MIT-0 8 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 344 tokens open source ↗ analyzed 25 h ago
IntegrationInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
C
72/100
Overall score
Safety 60%
80
Quality 40%
61
Tests bonus
0

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Review the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, allow the rule id under guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): it is the main trigger signal.
  3. Add evals/evals.json with 4–6 real requests and expected answers: the full check will then use your cases instead of a model draft.
  4. Add a spec.yaml with triggers and assertions (skilltest init): the behaviour contract for CI.

Guard findings · 3

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-destructive-fs selftest.sh:16
    Destructive filesystem command (wipes root/home/drive) (test fixture / example file)
    if ./runner.sh gpu status --json \; rm -rf / 2>/dev/null; then
    fixture
Medium and low: 2
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell runner.sh:102
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (string literal in code, not executed; the skill's own vendor host)
    echo_error "'gpu' binary not found on PATH. Please install: curl -fsSL https://gpu-cli.sh/install.sh | sh"
    code literalvendor-host
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SECURITY.md:42
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - **No privilege escalation** — runs as the current user with no elevated permissions

Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Lint

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process maturity 53/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 12 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 344 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 111: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +4Structure: 1 headings, hard to scan
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +4No input/output examples
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 12 items

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 61.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This appears to be a legitimate GPU CLI wrapper, but it grants broad command authority that can affect accounts, paid compute, and existing GPU jobs in ways that are not tightly scoped.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026