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智能验证码自动识别 Skill - 混合模式(本地 Tesseract OCR + 阿里云千问 3 VL Plus)。支持两阶段输入框查找、安全隐私警告。用于网页自动化中的验证码识别、填写和提交。
As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 4
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 4
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medium Exfiltration
net-redirectable-api-keyindex.mjs:47Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another serverAPI key + configurable base URL from environment
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low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeindex.mjs:595Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)args: ['--no-sandbox', '--disable-setuid-sandbox', '--disable-dev-shm-usage']
detectorcode literal -
low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalindex.mjs:729Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (detector / deny-list definition)if (arg.startsWith('--api-key=')) options.apiKey = arg.substring(10);detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalscripts/run.mjs:21Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)options.apiKey = arg.substring(10);
Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (node) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100Steps. 42 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1876 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
- low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 98: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
- -234 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 44 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 42 items
- +4Has examples (24 code blocks)
- +3All 1 scripts are documented
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 66.