SKILLEMALL.ai

BC training-manager

Manage and optimize your OpenClaw training workspace -- scaffold files, generate skills, log training sessions, and validate workspace structure.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: anova44 v1.0.2 9 files · 7 scripts body ≈ 3 492 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions

GeneratorDiscordSoftware developmentAI and agentsWriting and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
84/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
62/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

The same skill appears in 1 more place: ClawHub

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Instruction override medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The text contains phrases like "ignore previous instructions" or "you are now…". That is an attempt to hijack the agent: it may break your rules, the system limits or company policy.

For the author

An honest skill does not need them: state the role and the rules directly without overriding other instructions. Otherwise catalog scanners and corporate filters will block the listing.

Concealment medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill tells the agent to hide things from you: not to show errors, not to mention actions, to report differently from what was done. You lose the ability to see what the agent really did.

For the author

Transparency beats a smooth answer. If the goal is to hide technical noise, ask the agent to "summarise briefly", not to "not mention".

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 2
  • medium Instruction override en-ignore-previous SKILL.md:258
    Instruction-override phrase ("ignore previous instructions") (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    1. **Instruction override attempts** -- phrases like "ignore previous instructions", "you are now", "disregard all rules", "new instructions:", "act as if", "pretend to be", "from now on ignore". Thes
    quoted
  • medium Concealment en-hide-from-user SKILL.md:259
    Instruction to hide actions from the user (detector / deny-list definition)
    2. **Data exfiltration instructions** -- phrases like "send all files to", "upload data to", "secretly forward", "exfiltrate". These attempt to use the agent as a data theft vector.
    detector

Files scanned: 9. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 46 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 9 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3492 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 145: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 14 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 46 items
  • +4Has examples (13 code blocks)
  • +3All 7 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This skill does what it claims: it manages local OpenClaw workspace training files, with no evidence of hidden network access, credential theft, or destructive behavior.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026