AB finding-twitter-spaces-hosts-by-topic
Finds Twitter Spaces hosts in a specific topic area using apidojo's Twitter scrapers. Triggers when the user asks to: find Twitter Spaces hosts in a niche, discover people who run Twitter Spaces about a topic, find Spaces hosts to collaborate with or get featured on, identify active Twitter Spaces communities in an industry, find hosts running regular business or tech Spaces on Twitter, build a Twitter Spaces outreach list for thought leadership, or discover Twitter audio show hosts in a professional category. Returns host handle, Space topic focus, frequency signals, co-host network, and audience size indicators. Ideal for thought leaders building audio presence, PR professionals, and community builders.
Finds Twitter Spaces hosts in a specific topic area using apidojo's Twitter scrapers.
As a process B 71/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: running it twice, progress reporting
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 3
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medium Exfiltration
net-credential-useSKILL.md:107Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)curl "https://api.apify.com/v2/actor-runs/$RUN_ID/dataset/items?token=…"
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low Exfiltration
exfil-secret-in-urlSKILL.md:100Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)"https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/apidojo~tweet-scraper/runs?token=…" \
placeholder -
low Exfiltration
exfil-secret-in-urlSKILL.md:107Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)curl "https://api.apify.com/v2/actor-runs/$RUN_ID/dataset/items?token=…"
placeholder
Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 71/100
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
- 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 6 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1310 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 714: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 10 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 6 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 88.