SKILLEMALL.ai

BC openclaw-expert

OpenClaw self-hosted AI agent framework expert. Trigger for: openclaw.json, gateway, channels, models, skills, agents, secrets, cron, sandbox, memory, multi-agent, bindings, dmPolicy, SecretRef, session config, workspace files (AGENTS.md, SOUL.md, MEMORY.md), troubleshooting, security hardening. Covers installation, configuration, channel setup, memory tuning, Docker deployment.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Alexander Schneider v1.1.0 MIT-0 20 files body ≈ 3 468 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationDockerAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
80
Quality 40%
86
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 20

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 20
    • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url references/channels.md:127
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
      curl "https://api.telegram.org/bot<TOKEN>/getUpdates" | jq '.result[-1].message.from.id'
      placeholder
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/docker-setup.md:258
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      sudo chown -R 1000:$(id -g) ~/.openclaw
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/docker-setup.md:259
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      sudo chmod -R u+rwX,g+rwX,o-rwx ~/.openclaw
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/docker-setup.md:265
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      chmod -R 777 ~/.openclaw
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc references/docker-setup.md:352
      Writes to a shell startup file (documentation of a security skill)
      echo 'source ~/.clawdock/clawdock-helpers.sh' >> ~/.zshrc && source ~/.zshrc
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell references/examples.md:56
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (test fixture / example file; documentation of a security skill; the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -fsSL https://get.openclaw.ai | bash
      fixturesecurity skillvendor-host
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host references/examples.md:81
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (test fixture / example file; documentation of a security skill)
      curl -fsSL https://tailscale.com/install.sh | sh
      fixturesecurity skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host references/examples.md:178
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (test fixture / example file; documentation of a security skill)
      curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_22.x | sudo bash -
      fixturesecurity skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host references/examples.md:182
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (test fixture / example file; documentation of a security skill)
      curl -fsSL https://tailscale.com/install.sh | sh
      fixturesecurity skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host references/installation.md:115
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (documentation of a security skill)
      curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/phioranex/openclaw-docker/main/install.sh | sudo bash
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/installation.md:115
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/phioranex/openclaw-docker/main/install.sh | sudo bash
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host references/nodes-and-remote.md:50
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (documentation of a security skill)
      curl -fsSL https://tailscale.com/install.sh | sh
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host references/nodes-and-remote.md:155
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (documentation of a security skill)
      curl -fsSL https://tailscale.com/install.sh | sh
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/quick-reference.md:258
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
      | Permissions in Docker | `sudo chown -R 1000:$(id -g) ~/.openclaw` |
      tablesecurity skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host references/tailscale-integration.md:170
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (documentation of a security skill)
      curl -fsSL https://tailscale.com/install.sh | sh
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host references/tailscale-integration.md:182
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (documentation of a security skill)
      curl -fsSL https://tailscale.com/install.sh | sh
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/troubleshooting.md:288
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      sudo chown -R 1000:$(id -g) ~/.openclaw/workspace
      security skill

    A further 3 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

    Files scanned: 20. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 34 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3468 tokens
    • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 381: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 25 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 34 items
    • +4Has examples (15 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (17 of 17)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This documentation skill appears purpose-built for OpenClaw support, but some examples could lead users or agents to run unverified remote code, store secrets unsafely, or persist/export sensitive data without enough warning.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026