SKILLEMALL.ai

BC install-watchdog

Installs egregore watchdog daemon via launchd or systemd for autonomous relaunching

ClawHub Agent Skills author: athola v1.9.19 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 656 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ReferenceInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
88/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
78
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:62
      Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      `~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.egregore.watchdog.plist`
      quoted

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "triggers"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source_plugin"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (install-watchdog) differs from the folder (nm-egregore-install-watchdog)
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 12 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 656 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Description length 83: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Structure: 11 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 12 items
    • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 78.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill openly installs a persistent watchdog that can relaunch autonomous egregore sessions, which is purpose-aligned but high-impact enough to review carefully.
    LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 26 Aug 2026