BD openclaw-json-editing
Advanced JSON editing for OpenClaw configuration files, tools, and data structures. Handles JSON5 configs, schema validation, merge patching, env var substitution, and type-safe modifications.
As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 3
-
medium Exfiltration
net-credential-useSKILL.md:573Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $XAI_API_KEY" \
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medium Exfiltration
net-credential-useSKILL.md:577Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $OPENAI_API_KEY" \
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medium Exfiltration
net-credential-useSKILL.md:581Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOGETHER_API_KEY" \
Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when") - warning
body-longSKILL.md body ≈ 5986 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5986 tokens
- 100Steps. 33 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 192: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 57 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 33 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (35 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 63.