SKILLEMALL.ai

AC walletconnect-requester

Secure WalletConnect integration for AI agents. Connect to user wallets as a DApp (Proposer) without ever handling private keys. Request transactions and signatures - users approve everything in their wallet. Zero custody, maximum security. Use when you need to interact with user wallets securely via WalletConnect v2.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: bevanding v1.0.2 MIT-0 7 files body ≈ 2 285 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 50/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
91/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
97
Quality 40%
81
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
50/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 3

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 3
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/wc-requester.js:511
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      --to 0x83…913 \\
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:125
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      --to 0x83…913 \
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:270
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      --to 0x83…913 \

    Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 50/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 31 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2285 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 15 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -233 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
    • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 319: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 42 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 31 items
    • +4Has examples (18 code blocks)
    • +3All 1 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 81.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This WalletConnect skill is mostly coherent, but it needs review because it includes underdocumented raw transaction-signing authority and persistent wallet sessions.
    LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026