SKILLEMALL.ai

BC yeeth-claw

Supply chain security hooks for Claude Code. Intercepts npm, pip, yarn, pnpm, and cargo install commands before execution and checks each package for supply chain risk signals: package age (new packages flagged/blocked), typosquat detection via Levenshtein distance against ~100 high-value targets per ecosystem, and install script presence. Optionally submits blocked packages to the Argus API for full static analysis.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: bkojusner v1.0.0 MIT-0 10 files · 1 script body ≈ 485 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

IntegrationAI and agentsSoftware developmentInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
72
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key hooks/openclaw/hook.py:111
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment

Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 5 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 485 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 420: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 7 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 5 items
  • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 72.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This skill installs a disclosed Claude Code package-install security hook, with optional external analysis only when the user configures Argus credentials.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026