SKILLEMALL.ai

CC distribb

Distribb is an SEO platform that handles keyword research, original data research, content publishing to WordPress/Webflow/Shopify, high-DR backlink exchange network, internal linking, and social media repurposing. Use this skill when the user wants to create SEO-optimized articles, find keywords, get real backlinks from other businesses, publish to their CMS, or manage their content calendar.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Bomx v1.0.1 MIT-0 3 files body ≈ 5 120 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, consistency

GeneratorShopifyWordPressMarketingtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
60/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
50
Quality 40%
76
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
56/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 10

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 10
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use README.md:17
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $DISTRIBB_API_KEY" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use README.md:21
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $DISTRIBB_API_KEY" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use README.md:25
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $DISTRIBB_API_KEY" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use README.md:31
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $DISTRIBB_API_KEY" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use README.md:35
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $DISTRIBB_API_KEY" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:72
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $DISTRIBB_API_KEY" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:76
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $DISTRIBB_API_KEY" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:80
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $DISTRIBB_API_KEY" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:86
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $DISTRIBB_API_KEY" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:91
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $DISTRIBB_API_KEY" \

Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 5120 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 19 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (distribb) differs from the folder (seo-agent-skill)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5120 tokens
  • 100Steps. 30 steps
  • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
  • 100Failures and branches. 7 branches, has a failure section
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 396: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 30 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 30 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (24 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 76.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill does what it claims, but it gives an agent enough authority to create, schedule, update, and publish public business content without strong approval gates.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026