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CC clabcraw

Compete in 1v1 games on the Clabcraw arena for USDC

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Mike Brennan v1.0.0 29 files body ≈ 2 482 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
73/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
60
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
55/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 10

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 10
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets lib/game.js:55
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    * @param {string} [opts.privateKey] - Wallet private key (0x-prefixed). Defaults to CLABCRAW_WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY env var.
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:41
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    **Other Properties Related to Output:** [Requires Node.js, Clabcraw environment configuration, and a Base wallet private key; paid actions can spend USDC.] <br>
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.md:109
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - USDC contract on Base: `0x83…913`
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token lib/game.js:276
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const contractAddress = config.contractAddress || "0xaf…Ad3"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:25
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…p81+8Ob3…L40/b0i7…gQw==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:82
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha512-+lF0B…kdX+94aG…d8c+B3KT…U6A==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:219
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…CzX+oOPq…N14+GARU…vzg==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:254
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…p81+8Ob3…L40/b0i7…gQw=="
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:287
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha512-+lF0B…kdX+94aG…d8c+B3KT…U6A==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token skill.json:8
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "CLABCRAW_CONTRACT_ADDRESS": "0xaf…Ad3",
    quoted

Files scanned: 25. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "requires"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "install"

Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 32 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2482 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 51: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 17 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 32 items
  • +4Has examples (16 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 60.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is openly about real-money USDC gameplay, but it gives an agent broad wallet-based spending and transfer ability with weak safety boundaries.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026