BC tally
Tally API integration with managed OAuth. Manage forms, submissions, workspaces, webhooks, organization users, and organization invites. All write operations require explicit user approval. Organization user removal and invite management affect account membership. Webhooks send form submission data (which may contain personal information) to external URLs — confirm the destination before creating. Use this skill when users want to manage Tally forms, submissions, workspaces, or organization membership. For other third party apps, use the api-gateway skill (https://clawhub.ai/byungkyu/api-gateway). Requires network access and valid Maton API key. Calls run through the `maton` CLI with OAuth login; default to read and list calls, and confirm every write or new connection with the user.
As a process C 60/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, consistency
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.
Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.
How to improve
- The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 1
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 1
-
medium Broad scope
meta-broad-allowed-toolsSKILL.md:1Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bashallowed-tools: Bash Read Grep Glob
Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
body-longSKILL.md body ≈ 6150 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
Process rating: all ten parameters 60/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 30Running it twice. 43 mutating operations with no state check
- 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (tally) differs from the folder (tally-api)
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 6150 tokens
- 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
- 100Steps. 81 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 6 branches, has a failure section
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 15 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
- high The skill tells the model to perform an irreversible action with no human approval
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 794: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 67 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 81 items
- +4Has examples (60 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 74.