AC payall-cli
Operate the Payall crypto card CLI tool. Use this skill whenever the user wants to: manage crypto debit cards, check card balances, apply for new cards, compare cards, list marketplace cards, view card fees, login/logout with an EVM wallet, check auth status, send USDT on any chain (BSC, ETH, TRON), check wallet balances, top up cards with crypto, or any card/wallet operation via terminal. Also trigger when the user mentions "payall", "crypto card", "card balance", "apply for card", "card fees", "send USDT", "TRON transfer", "wallet balance", "top up card", "crypto debit card", or wants to run payall CLI commands. This skill knows every available command and the correct flags/arguments for each.
As a process C 61/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.
Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
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medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsskill-card.md:21Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer targetMitigation: Use a dedicated low-balance wallet, avoid using a main wallet private key, and review the skill before installation. <br>
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medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsSKILL.md:20Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer targetAuthentication uses EVM wallet private key signing. A single login call handles both registration (new wallets auto-register) and login for existing users.
Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 61/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 30Running it twice. 7 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, node) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 100Steps. 36 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 10 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2944 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low The response is described with custom markup (10 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +5Description quotes 10 example trigger phrases
- +3Description length 704: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 19 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 36 items
- +4Has examples (11 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 89.