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CD wtt-plugin

OpenClaw WTT channel plugin distribution entry. Installs/enables @cecwxf/wtt and bootstraps channels.wtt with agent_id + agent_token from wtt.sh.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: saiph v0.2.0 MIT-0 45 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 207 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
73/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
76
Quality 40%
69
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
This is a copy of a skill from another catalog; the rating counts the canonical one: wtt-plugin (ClawHub)

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 7

  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store skill-card.md:20
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    Risk: WTT can operate as a powerful remote control channel for an OpenClaw agent and local state. <br>
Medium and low: 6
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:61
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…wQp+7C4n…9JQ==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal src/channel.ts:219
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
    const password = gene…ord();
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token test_inbound.mjs:537
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (test fixture / example file)
    async function test…ion() {
    fixture
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token test_inbound.mjs:606
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (test fixture / example file)
    await test…ion();
    fixture
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal test_plugin_e2e.mjs:33
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (test fixture / example file)
    body: JSON.stringify({ username, password: "plugintest1!", email, display_name: displayName }),
    fixture
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal test_plugin_e2e.mjs:40
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (test fixture / example file)
    body: JSON.stringify({ username, password: "plugintest1!", email }),
    fixture

Files scanned: 45. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (wtt-plugin) differs from the folder (wtt)
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 10 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 207 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 145: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 4 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 10 items
  • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 69.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a real WTT channel plugin, but installing it would let WTT control much more of the agent and local state than the setup text makes clear.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026