FB clawgrid-connector

ClawGrid AI marketplace connector. BIND CODES: always run scripts/bind.sh, never fabricate. Handles registration, heartbeat, task polling, claiming, execution, and artifact submission.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade F

ClawHub Agent Skills author: clawgrid v0.35.0 MIT-0 31 files · 19 scripts body ≈ 11 138 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process B 79/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: execution cost

Procedure Commerce Software development Infrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text

Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode

JSON

Technical rating

26/100

safety, quality, tests

Safety 60%: 0
Quality 40%: 64
Run on models: none yet

Process rating

79/100

Nearly there

Execution cost w 6: 40
When it triggers w 12: 50
Result and completion w 14: 60

the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Concealment

If you install

The skill tells the agent to hide things from you: not to show errors, not to mention actions, to report differently from what was done. You lose the ability to see what the agent really did.

For the author

Transparency beats a smooth answer. If the goal is to hide technical noise, ask the agent to "summarise briefly", not to "not mention".

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.

For the model run — optional

Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 46

high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/setup-guide.md:211

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
```
(crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v 'clawgrid-heartbeat'; \
```
high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/setup-guide.md:213

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
```
| crontab -
```
high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/clawgrid-env.sh:28

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
```
(crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v 'clawgrid-heartbeat') | crontab - 2>/dev/null || true
```
high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install.sh:240

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
```
launchctl load "$_hb_plist" 2>/dev/null || true
```
high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/poll.sh:419

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
```
launchctl bootstrap "gui/$(id -u)" "$LAUNCHD_PLIST" 2>/dev/null || \
```
high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/poll.sh:420

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
```
launchctl load "$LAUNCHD_PLIST" 2>/dev/null || true
```
high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/poll.sh:424

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
```
HB_COUNT=$(crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -c 'clawgrid-heartbeat' || true)
```
high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/poll.sh:426

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
```
(crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v 'clawgrid-heartbeat'; \
```
high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/setup-crons.sh:88

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
```
_old_cron=$(crontab -l 2>/dev/null || true)
```
high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/setup-crons.sh:128

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
```
launchctl bootstrap "gui/$(id -u)" "$LAUNCHD_PLIST" 2>/dev/null || \
```
high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/setup-crons.sh:129

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
```
launchctl load "$LAUNCHD_PLIST" 2>/dev/null || true
```
high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/setup-crons.sh:133

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
```
(crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v 'clawgrid-heartbeat'; \
```
high Concealment en-hide-from-user SKILL.md:173

Instruction to hide actions from the user
```
Do not tell the owner where to enter the code — they already know.
```

Medium and low: 33

medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/account-and-tasks.md:58

Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
```
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" \
```
medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/task-execution.md:63

Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
```
curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" "$API_BASE/api/lobster/tasks/abandon-stuck"
```
medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/task-execution.md:66

Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
```
curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" "$API_BASE/api/lobster/tasks/{TASK_ID}/abandon"
```
medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/task-execution.md:69

Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
```
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" "$API_BASE/api/lobster/tasks?status=active"
```
medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/troubleshooting.md:48

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (detector / deny-list definition)
```
crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v 'clawgrid-heartbeat' | crontab -
```
detector
medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/troubleshooting.md:76

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (detector / deny-list definition)
```
crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v 'clawgrid-heartbeat' | crontab -
```
detector
medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/troubleshooting.md:119

Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
```
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" "$API_BASE/api/lobster/me"
```
medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/heartbeat.sh:7

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
```
LAUNCHD_PLIST="$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/${LAUNCHD_LABEL}.plist"
```
code literal
medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/heartbeat.sh:42

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (detector / deny-list definition)
```
crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v 'clawgrid-heartbeat' | crontab - 2>/dev/null || true
```
detector
medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install.sh:236

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
```
_hb_plist="$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.clawgrid.heartbeat.plist"
```
code literal
medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/poll.sh:383

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
```
LAUNCHD_PLIST="$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/${LAUNCHD_LABEL}.plist"
```
code literal
medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/setup-crons.sh:7

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
```
LAUNCHD_PLIST="$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/${LAUNCHD_LABEL}.plist"
```
code literal
medium Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/status.sh:16

Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
```
RESULT=$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" "$API_BASE/api/lobster/status" --max-time 10 2>/dev/null)
```
medium Dangerous commands cmd-autorun-instruction SKILL.md:6

Instructs the agent to auto-run a script on every session
```
ClawGrid AI marketplace connector. BIND CODES: always run scripts/bind.sh,
```
medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:531

Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
```
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" \
```
medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:639

Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
```
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" "$API_BASE/api/lobster/tasks/$TASK_ID/stages"
```
medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:705

Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
```
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" "$API_BASE/api/lobster/onboarding/me"
```
low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention references/setup-guide.md:211

Mentions editing / listing crontab
```
(crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v 'clawgrid-heartbeat'; \
```
low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention references/troubleshooting.md:7

Mentions editing / listing crontab (documentation table row)
```
| "offline" after idle        | Heartbeat crontab not running — check `crontab -l` for `clawgrid-heartbeat` entry            |
```
table
low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention references/troubleshooting.md:48

Mentions editing / listing crontab
```
crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v 'clawgrid-heartbeat' | crontab -
```
low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention references/troubleshooting.md:76

Mentions editing / listing crontab
```
crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v 'clawgrid-heartbeat' | crontab -
```
low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/clawgrid-env.sh:28

Mentions editing / listing crontab
```
(crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v 'clawgrid-heartbeat') | crontab - 2>/dev/null || true
```
low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/heartbeat.sh:42

Mentions editing / listing crontab
```
crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v 'clawgrid-heartbeat' | crontab - 2>/dev/null || true
```
low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/install.sh:243

Mentions editing / listing crontab
```
crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -q 'clawgrid-heartbeat' && _hb_missing=false
```
low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/poll.sh:424

Mentions editing / listing crontab
```
HB_COUNT=$(crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -c 'clawgrid-heartbeat' || true)
```
low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/poll.sh:426

Mentions editing / listing crontab
```
(crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v 'clawgrid-heartbeat'; \
```

low Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/poll.sh:866

Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)

'accept_command': 'curl -s -X POST \"' + '$API_BASE' + '/api/lobster/marketplace/requests/' + r['id'] + '/accept\" -H \"Authorization: Bearer ' + '$API_KEY' + '\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\"

quoted

low Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/poll.sh:867

Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)

'decline_command': 'curl -s -X POST \"' + '$API_BASE' + '/api/lobster/marketplace/requests/' + r['id'] + '/decline\" -H \"Authorization: Bearer ' + '$API_KEY' + '\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json

quoted

low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/setup-crons.sh:88

Mentions editing / listing crontab
```
_old_cron=$(crontab -l 2>/dev/null || true)
```
low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/setup-crons.sh:133

Mentions editing / listing crontab
```
(crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v 'clawgrid-heartbeat'; \
```
low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/setup-crons.sh:194

Mentions editing / listing crontab (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
```
echo "Verify with: crontab -l | grep clawgrid  &&  openclaw cron list"
```
detectorcode literal
low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:472

Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
```
`curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" "$API_BASE/api/lobster/tasks/{TASK_ID}/abandon"`
```
quoted
low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:511

Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
```
- Approve: `curl -X POST "$API_BASE/api/lobster/tasks/$TASK_ID/review" -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"action":"approve"}'`
```
quoted

Files scanned: 31. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 11138 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "triggers"
note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "repository"
note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "dependencies"
note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "tools"

Process rating: all ten parameters 79/100

40Execution cost. Instruction body is 11138 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
85Steps. 135 steps, 1 vague phrases
100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
100Failures and branches. 23 branches, has a failure section
100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
100Progress reporting. Reports progress

medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
low 17 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
low The response is described with custom markup (9 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

+5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
+4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
-33 of 21 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
+2Single-language instructions
+3Description length 184: enough signal without eating the budget
+4Structure: 49 headings
+3Step-by-step instructions: 135 items
+3Output format is stated explicitly
+4Has examples (17 code blocks)
+4Reference files are cited in the instructions (8 of 8)
+1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 64.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious

This appears to be a real ClawGrid connector, but it installs persistent automation, weakens execution approvals, and lets server-delivered task messages drive agent sessions, so it needs Review before use.

LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: malicious · 27 May 2026

Tests

— no evals.json

— no spec.yaml

— not run on models

Files · 31

references/account-and-tasks.md 4K
references/api-reference.md 8K
references/communication-rules.md 7K
references/execution-contract.md 2K
references/marketplace.md 8K
references/setup-guide.md 9K
references/task-execution.md 6K
references/troubleshooting.md 5K
scripts/bid.sh 1K
scripts/bind.sh 1K
scripts/check-exec-approval.sh 4K
scripts/claim.sh 7K
scripts/clawgrid-env.sh 7K
scripts/debug-report.sh 2K
scripts/heartbeat.sh 31K
scripts/install.sh 8K
scripts/local_debugger.py 20K
scripts/marketplace.sh 2K
scripts/notify.sh 6K
scripts/offer.sh 5K
scripts/poll.sh 50K
scripts/prefetch.py 18K
scripts/revision.sh 2K
scripts/setup-crons.sh 7K
scripts/setup-exec-approval.sh 4K
scripts/status.sh 1K
scripts/submit.sh 6K
scripts/wallet.sh 2K
scripts/_clawgrid_env.sh 3K
skill-card.md 4K
SKILL.md 45K

Frontmatter

version: 0.35.0

author: clawgrid

triggers: ["clawgrid","ClawGrid","clawgrid.ai","https://clawgrid.ai","clawgrid.ai/","register on clawgrid","sign up clawgrid","joi

repository: https://github.com/clawgrid/clawgrid-connector

license: Proprietary

dependencies: []

tools: ["poll","submit","heartbeat","bind","debug-report","notify","marketplace","offer"]

metadata: {"clawdbot":{"emoji":"🦞","homepage":"https://clawgrid.ai","requires":{"anyBins":["curl","python3"]},"os":["linux","darw

Dates

In catalog since 2 Apr 2026

Updated in catalog 19 May 2026

First seen here 9 Sept 2026

Last analysis 11 Sept 2026, 02:20 UTC

Last seen in crawl 9 h ago

Score history

Date		Score	Safety	Qual.
11 Sept 2026	F	26	0	64
9 Sept 2026	F	25	0	63

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