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DF liquidskills

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: JF v0.1.0 21 files body ≈ 2 003 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process F 30/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: ship/SKILL.md, why/SKILL.md, gas/SKILL.md

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
57/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
30/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: ship/SKILL.md, why/SKILL.md, gas/SKILL.md
Tools and files w 18
0
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
  2. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:22
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    Mitigation: Use limited API wallets, never provide a main wallet private key to an agent, and scope permissions to the smallest practical account or wallet. <br>

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: ship/SKILL.md
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: why/SKILL.md
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: gas/SKILL.md
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: wallets/SKILL.md
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: architecture/SKILL.md
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: standards/SKILL.md
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: tools/SKILL.md
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: building-blocks/SKILL.md
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: orchestration/SKILL.md
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: addresses/SKILL.md
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: concepts/SKILL.md
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: security/SKILL.md
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: testing/SKILL.md
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: indexing/SKILL.md
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: api/SKILL.md
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: frontend-ux/SKILL.md
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: frontend-playbook/SKILL.md
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: qa/SKILL.md
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: audit/SKILL.md

Process rating: all ten parameters 30/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: ship/SKILL.md, why/SKILL.md, gas/SKILL.md
  • 0Tools and files. 19 referenced file(s) missing: ship/SKILL.md, why/SKILL.md, gas/SKILL.md
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 9 mutating operations with no state check
  • 100Steps. 57 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2003 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +4No input/output examples
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 23 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 57 items

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a documentation-only Hyperliquid skill, but it includes live trading, transfer, withdrawal, deployment, and conflicting bridge guidance that can affect real funds if copied or automated.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026