SKILLEMALL.ai

DC gmail-label-manager

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Coenenp v1.0.3 3 files · 1 script body ≈ 376 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

ReferenceGmailTelegramInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
D
56/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
94
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
56/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Obfuscation medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain invisible characters, encoded commands or comments hidden from readers but visible to the model. What you read differs from what the agent sees.

For the author

Remove invisible characters (they usually sneak in through copy-paste) and encoded strings: no catalog will pass them. Instructions for the model must be readable by a human too.

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 2
  • medium Obfuscation uni-zero-width script.sh:905
    Zero-width / invisible characters (possible hidden text) (4 occurrences)
    local telegram_message="<b>␀ school Parent-Teacher Conference</b>
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url script.sh:294
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    "https://api.telegram.org/bot${TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN}/sendMessage" \
    placeholder

Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 7 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 376 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +4No input/output examples
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 6 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 7 items

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This Gmail organizer can change mailbox state and, if configured, forward sensitive email details to Telegram and create calendar events without those behaviors being clearly disclosed in the skill instructions.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026