SKILLEMALL.ai
RU Sign in

AB even-g2-bridge

Connect Even Realities G2 smart glasses to OpenClaw via Cloudflare Worker. Deploys a bridge that routes G2 voice commands to your OpenClaw Gateway — same agent, same memory, same tools, just voice instead of typing. Supports short conversations (direct reply on glasses), long tasks (background processing with Telegram delivery), and image generation (DALL-E → Telegram). Use when: setting up G2 glasses with OpenClaw, deploying the G2 bridge worker, or troubleshooting G2 ↔ OpenClaw connectivity.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Ju Chun Ko v5.2.0 5 files body ≈ 1 108 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice

IntegrationTelegramCloudflareGitHubInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
92/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
98
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
68/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 2

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 2
    • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/worker.js:185
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
      await fetch(`https://api.telegram.org/bot${env.TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN}/sendPhoto`, {
      placeholder
    • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/worker.js:202
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
      await fetch(`https://api.telegram.org/bot${env.TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN}/sendMessage`, {
      placeholder

    Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 34 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1108 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 498: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 15 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 34 items
    • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
    • +3All 1 scripts are documented
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This is a coherent G2-to-OpenClaw bridge, but it creates a high-authority voice-controlled internet path to the main agent and can automatically forward raw prompts and results to third-party services.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026