SKILLEMALL.ai

DC multi-agent-orchestration

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: dabruhce v1.0.0 44 files body ≈ 3 844 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
D
57/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump colony/memory/doctor.md
    Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (13) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
    colony/memory/doctor.md, colony/memory/echo.md, colony/memory/forecast.md, colony/memory/forge.md, colony/memory/ledger.md

Files scanned: 44. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 30Running it twice. 11 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 56 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3844 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 51 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 56 items
  • +4Has examples (35 code blocks)
  • +3All 5 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a coherent multi-agent orchestration skill, but it gives background agents broad coding, file, deployment, notification, and persistent-memory authority with weak safety boundaries.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026