SKILLEMALL.ai

BA integral-hermeneutics

Comprehensive self-contained interpretation methodology for analyzing ANY text, statement, system, behavior, artifact, or phenomenon through multiple integrated lenses. Use this skill whenever the user asks to interpret, analyze meaning, understand perspectives, decode messages, analyze intent, compare frameworks, perform hermeneutic analysis, engage in deep reading, understand worldview differences, perform ideological analysis, or needs to "get inside someone's head." Also use for meta-interpretation (interpreting interpretations), conflict analysis, cultural translation, philosophical inquiry, and any situation requiring nuanced multi-layered understanding that goes beyond surface meaning. Embraces methodological pluralism including empirical tools where they fit, empathic immersion, perspectival plurality, dialectical tension, and honest acknowledgment of interpretive boundaries and the unknowable.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: DarkD v1.1.2 MIT-0 1 file body ≈ 24 143 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process A 81/100 · Runs to the end — weak spots: execution cost, progress reporting

AnalyzerResearchtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
74
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
A
81/100
Runs to the end
Progress reporting w 2
0
Execution cost w 6
10
Result and completion w 14
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 5
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:126
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    **The Red Team:** After completing the Position Inventory, construct a reader who does not share
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:128
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    Counter-Position Exercise). The Red Team targets your *position*, not your reading. Using what
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:135
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    missed or dismissed. If the Red Team produces nothing that surprises you, you have not built an
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:138
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    After building your Red Team reader, check: does this adversarial reader challenge your *empathic
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:144
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    are least likely to recognize. In that case, the Red Team must include a reader who rejects the

Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 24143 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 81/100

  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 10Execution cost. Instruction body is 24143 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 85Steps. 273 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Failures and branches. 31 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 15 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 915: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 61 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 273 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 74.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This is a prompt-only interpretation framework with broad psychological and cultural analysis guidance, but no code, install step, persistence, credential use, or hidden execution behavior.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 28 May 2026