AD mindkeeper
Bootstrap a complete 3-layer memory system for any OpenClaw agent. PARA knowledge structure, QMD search integration, daily consolidation cron, transcript verification, and end-of-day sign-off routine — all in one install. Use when: setting up memory, initializing a knowledge base, bootstrapping memory, configuring PARA structure, setting up QMD, creating a second brain, organizing agent knowledge, enabling daily consolidation, or configuring sign-off routines.
As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.
Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-hostreferences/qmd-setup.md:39Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash
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medium Broad scope
meta-agent-memory-dumptemplates/memory.mdAgent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (1) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokenstemplates/memory.md
Files scanned: 13. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
- 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (mindkeeper) differs from the folder (inkwell)
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
- 85Steps. 17 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1212 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 464: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 15 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 17 items
- +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (4 of 4)
- +3All 1 scripts are documented
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 91.