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DC issue-analysis-agent

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: davidunderwood7970 v1.0.0 MIT-0 15 files body ≈ 773 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
54/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Secrets in code medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 6
  • medium Secrets in code secret-labelled-token upload_cos.py:32
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)
    SECRET_KEY = '570J…DE1'
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token config.json:16
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "secret_id": "AKID…Llz",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token config.json:17
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "secret_key": "570J…DE1",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token upload_cos.py:31
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    SECRET_ID = 'AKID…Llz'
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token upload_cos.py:32
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    SECRET_KEY = '570J…DE1'
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal upload_cos.py:32
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
    SECRET_KEY = '570J…DE1'

Files scanned: 15. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 75 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 773 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
  • -243 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 21 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 75 items
  • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill does what it says, but it embeds cloud credentials and publishes support reports to a public URL by default, which can expose internal issue and personnel data.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026