AB cannon
Cannon package manager for Ethereum deployments. Use when building, testing, deploying, or inspecting Cannon packages. Covers cannonfile syntax, CLI commands (build, run, test, publish, inspect), actions (deploy, invoke, clone, pull, router, diamond), and package workflows. NOT for general Solidity development questions.
As a process B 65/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, running it twice, progress reporting
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellSKILL.md:58Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (detector / deny-list definition)- **Foundry** (forge, anvil, cast) - `curl -L https://foundry.paradigm.xyz | bash && foundryup`
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenreferences/registry.md:11High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)Registry address: `0x8E…708`
quoted
Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 65/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 66 mutating operations with no state check
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, node) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 46 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3101 tokens
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 21 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 322: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 40 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 46 items
- +4Has examples (22 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (4 of 4)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 92.