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CC rumble-autotip

Autonomous AI agent that tips Rumble.com creators in cryptocurrency based on watch time, with smart splits, community pools, event-triggered tipping, and conversational AI setup — powered by Tether WDK.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Dev-me v2.0.1 MIT-0 3 files body ≈ 2 109 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

ProcedureAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
74/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
75
Quality 40%
72
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
58/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 5
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:21
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    Mitigation: Review before installing, use a separate low-balance wallet, avoid importing a primary seed phrase, and confirm comfort with irreversible transfers based on browser activity and configured
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:46
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    - BIP-39 seed phrase (generate or import)
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:93
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    - "Set up my wallet" — Generate or import BIP-39 seed phrase
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:200
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    - Non-custodial: user controls their BIP-39 seed phrase at all times
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:217
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    - **Seed phrase**: Stored locally in Chrome extension storage, encrypted with AES-GCM (PBKDF2 key derivation, 100K iterations). Never transmitted externally.

Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 11 mutating operations with no state check
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 79 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2109 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 202: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 24 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 79 items
  • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 72.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is transparent about autonomous crypto tipping, but it gives persistent wallet authority for irreversible payments and needs careful review before use.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026