SKILLEMALL.ai
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FC best-practice-skill-creator

Create OpenClaw skills from best practice videos or image sequences. Use when creating skill from video, generating skill from screenshots, converting tutorial to skill, building best practice automation.

Blockedguard blocked the skill: signs of malicious behaviour
ClawHub Agent Skills author: DiffuseFutureTech v1.0.0 MIT-0 17 files body ≈ 436 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

GeneratorMedia and videoInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
41/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
10
Quality 40%
87
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
59/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
Guard blocked this skill: critical findings below. Do not install it until the author fixes them.

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Secrets in code
If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Remove the critical guard findings (secrets, dangerous commands, hidden instructions): while they stand the skill is blocked and cannot grade above F.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

  • critical Secrets in code secret-openai-key config.yaml:11
    OpenAI-style API key (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    api_key: "sk-9…nRs"
    quoted
Medium and low: 5
  • medium Secrets in code secret-labelled-token config.yaml:11
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)
    api_key: "sk-9…nRs"
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key main.py:88
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key src/config.py:64
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token config.yaml:11
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    api_key: "sk-9…nRs"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal config.yaml:11
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
    api_key: "sk-9…nRs"

Files scanned: 17. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 13 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 436 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 204: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 5 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 13 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill’s main purpose is coherent, but it ships an embedded API key and uploads user screenshots or video frames to an under-disclosed external model endpoint.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026