SKILLEMALL.ai
RU Sign in

FC syncause-debugger

Diagnose and fix bugs using runtime execution traces. Use when debugging errors, analyzing failures, or finding root causes in Python, Node.js, or Java applications.

Blockedguard blocked the skill: signs of malicious behaviour
ClawHub Agent Skills author: dxsup v1.0.0 MIT-0 10 files body ≈ 2 388 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
40/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
10
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
Guard blocked this skill: critical findings below. Do not install it until the author fixes them.
This is a copy of a skill from another catalog; the rating counts the canonical one: syncause-debugger (ClawHub)

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Secrets in code
If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Remove the critical guard findings (secrets, dangerous commands, hidden instructions): while they stand the skill is blocked and cannot grade above F.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 3

  • critical Secrets in code secret-github-token references/install/java.md:30
    GitHub token
    <sync….p1>gith…zzD</sync….p1>
Medium and low: 2
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host references/install/nodejs.md:8
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -sL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Syncause/ts-agent-file/v1.6.0/install_probe.sh | bash
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/install/java.md:31
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    <sync….p2>7rsI…cE0</sync….p2>

Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (syncause-debugger) differs from the folder (runtime-debug-skill)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 53 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 3 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2388 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • low The response is described with custom markup (5 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 165: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 8 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 53 items
  • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This appears to be a real runtime debugging skill, but it asks for broad project modification, secret placement, remote installers, and external trace collection without enough safeguards.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026