SKILLEMALL.ai

BC memphis-cli

Operate the Memphis local-first brain: init/status checks, journaling, recall/ask, embeddings, vault, share-sync, graphs, reflections, ingestion, automated messaging, and troubleshooting. Use whenever you need to capture or query memory chains, manage providers, or keep the Watra/Style brain in sync.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: elathoxu-crypto v2.1.1 1 file body ≈ 2 295 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, running it twice

IntegrationAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
88/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
78
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
62/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Running it twice w 4
30
Failures and branches w 10
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc SKILL.md:276
      Writes to a shell startup file
      echo 'export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH"' >> ~/.bashrc

    Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 30Running it twice. 12 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 85Steps. 60 steps, 1 vague phrases
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2295 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • low The response is described with custom markup (3 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 301: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 32 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 60 items
    • +4Has examples (12 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 78.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill is mostly instruction-only, but it asks agents to enable cloud syncing and recurring background messaging with weak scoping and an exposed shared encryption key.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026