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DC kindle-clip-cli

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Nan Ding v1.1.0 MIT-0 8 files body ≈ 1 650 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

IntegrationInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
51/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
85
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
59/100
Has gaps
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 3

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 3
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege INSTALL.md:54
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo mv kindle-clip /usr/local/bin/
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege INSTALL.md:70
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo mv kindle-clip /usr/local/bin/
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege INSTALL.md:201
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo rm /usr/local/bin/kindle-clip

Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100

  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 100Steps. 31 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 3 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1650 tokens
  • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 25 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 31 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (13 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill appears to do what it says, but it too readily saves or shares potentially private Kindle notes and uses a risky install pattern.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026