SKILLEMALL.ai

DC uninstaller

Guides users through safely uninstalling OpenClaw (龙虾). Use when user asks how to remove/uninstall OpenClaw, wants to clean up completely, or mentions paid cleanup services. Provides free, verifiable steps and scripts. Supports IM-initiated uninstall via one-shot. Community-maintained, no commercial motive.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: ERerGB v1.0.0-4e6ce7f MIT-0 26 files · 14 scripts body ≈ 1 397 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice

AnalyzerInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
D
42/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
16
Quality 40%
81
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
59/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 8

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/schedule-uninstall.sh:112
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load "$PLIST" 2>/dev/null && echo "macOS uninstall scheduled (plist), will run in ~${DELAY}s." || {
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/uninstall-oneshot.sh:144
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    rm -f ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.gateway.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/uninstall-oneshot.sh:145
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    for f in ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openclaw.*.plist; do
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:116
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    rm -f ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.gateway.plist
Medium and low: 4
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/verify-clean.sh:38
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    elif [[ -f "$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.gateway.plist" ]]; then
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/verify-clean.sh:39
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    echo "[RESIDUE] launchd plist: ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.gateway.plist"
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/schedule-uninstall.sh:124
    Starts a background / autostarted process (code comment; security demo / example)
    # Fallback: nohup + disown (works when systemd-run unavailable, e.g. WSL2 without systemd)
    commentdemo
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/schedule-uninstall.sh:126
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    disown -a 2>/dev/null || true

Files scanned: 23. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 10 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 35 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1397 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -37 of 11 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 308: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 18 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 35 items
  • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 81.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a real OpenClaw uninstaller, but it needs review because it can schedule destructive host-side removal and performs an install-time ClawHub star action.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026