SKILLEMALL.ai

AB mumo

Runs a multi-model deliberation across models from different labs (Claude, GPT, Gemini, Grok, DeepSeek, Kimi, and more) via mumo's MCP server, returning full responses plus typed cross-model reactions. Use when independent perspectives are needed on architecture/product decisions, design and plan review before implementation, pre-launch pressure tests, tradeoffs with multiple defensible framings, or explicit user requests for a mumo panel. Especially valuable for pre-implementation review of anything touching auth, security, tokens, payments, data exposure, or migrations. Requires a mumo platform API key (mmo_live_*) registered with `openclaw mcp set mumo`.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Eric H v0.6.2 MIT-0 15 files body ≈ 4 192 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process B 77/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
92/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
97
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
77/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
30
Execution cost w 6
70
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 3

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 3
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security playbooks/red-team.md:1
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # Red Team
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security playbooks/red-team.md:15
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      Red team rounds produce two kinds of findings:
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security README.md:69
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      Either way, the skill ships the canonical `SKILL.md`, four cognitive-shape playbooks (contested decision, design review, uncertainty expansion, red team), and reference docs for claim-map reading, sni

    Files scanned: 15. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 77/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 30Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4192 tokens
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 47 steps
    • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
    • 100Failures and branches. 8 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • low 20 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +4No input/output examples
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 665: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 21 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 47 items
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (6 of 6)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill is coherent and not malicious, but it asks agents to send potentially sensitive design and security material to an external multi-model service without enough built-in consent, redaction, or sharing guardrails.
    LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 9 Sept 2026