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Search and scrape Indeed job listings and company information using Bright Data's Web Scraper API. Use when the user asks to find jobs on Indeed, search for job postings by keyword or location, look up company information from Indeed, collect job listing details from Indeed URLs, discover companies by industry, or perform any Indeed-related recruiting research. Requires BRIGHTDATA_API_KEY env var. Supports: job search by keyword/location/URL, company lookup by URL/keyword/industry, batch collection with polling, and structured JSON output.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Tee Bunsopha v0.1.4 21 files · 14 scripts body ≈ 1 816 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process B 72/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, running it twice

IntegrationInfrastructurePeople and hiringtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
88
Quality 40%
86
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
72/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Running it twice w 4
30
Failures and branches w 10
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 4

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 4
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/_lib.sh:42
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      local curl_args=(-s -w "\n%{http_code}" -H "Authorization: Bearer ${api_key}")
    • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
      Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
      allowed-tools: Bash
    • low Obfuscation obf-hex-escape-chain scripts/indeed_format_results.sh:169
      Escaped/char-code string obfuscation (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      printf '\xe2\x94\x81\xe2\x94\x81\xe2\x94\x81\xe2\x94\x81\xe2\x94\x81\xe2\x94\x81\xe2\x94\x81\xe2\x94\x81\xe2\x94\x81\xe2\x94\x81\xe2\x94\x81\xe2\x94\x81\xe2\x94\x81\xe2\x94\x81\xe2\x94\x81\xe2\x94\x81
      quoted
    • low Obfuscation obf-hex-escape-chain scripts/indeed_format_results.sh:177
      Escaped/char-code string obfuscation (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      printf '\xe2\x94\x81\xe2\x94\x81\xe2\x94\x81\xe2\x94\x81\xe2\x94\x81\xe2\x94\x81\xe2\x94\x81\xe2\x94\x81\xe2\x94\x81\xe2\x94\x81\xe2\x94\x81\xe2\x94\x81\xe2\x94\x81\xe2\x94\x81\xe2\x94\x81\xe2\x94\x81
      quoted

    Files scanned: 20. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 72/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 14 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1816 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -31 of 13 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 545: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 15 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 14 items
    • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill generally does what it says, but its cleanup code can delete files named in a local history file instead of limiting deletion to its own results folder.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026