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BB binance-dca

Professional Binance Dollar-Cost Averaging (DCA) tool for automated and manual recurring crypto purchases. Plan DCA strategies with scenario analysis, execute market/limit buys, track history, and manage systematic accumulation schedules for any trading pair. Includes risk management, testnet support, and OpenClaw automation integration. Triggers on requests about DCA, recurring buys, cost averaging, accumulation strategies, or Binance spot purchases.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: fpsjago v1.2.0 3 files · 1 script body ≈ 4 696 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process B 66/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, running it twice

IntegrationInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
83/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
79
Quality 40%
88
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
66/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
Tools and files w 18
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 5

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 5
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/dca.sh:52
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -sf -H "X-MBX-APIKEY: ${BINANCE_API_KEY}" \
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/dca.sh:55
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -sf -X "$method" -H "X-MBX-APIKEY: ${BINANCE_API_KEY}" \
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc SKILL.md:66
      Writes to a shell startup file
      echo 'export BINANCE_API_KEY="your-api-key-here"' >> ~/.bashrc
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc SKILL.md:67
      Writes to a shell startup file
      echo 'export BINANCE_SECRET_KEY="your-secret-key-here"' >> ~/.bashrc
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process SKILL.md:490
      Starts a background / autostarted process
      sudo systemctl enable systemd-timesyncd

    Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 66/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4696 tokens
    • 85Steps. 127 steps, 2 vague phrases
    • 100Failures and branches. 6 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • -231 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 455: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 53 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 127 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (35 code blocks)
    • +3All 1 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 88.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This Binance DCA skill matches its trading purpose, but it should be reviewed carefully because it can place live orders and contains unsafe code execution and credential-persistence risks.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 10 Sept 2026