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BD security-guard

Enforce strict security rules to protect sensitive information (API keys, tokens, credentials, PII, financial data). Always sanitize or refuse to reveal full sensitive data in ANY chat (private or group). Guide users to view sensitive info locally instead. Apply session initialization protocol at start of every session. Use when handling requests involving sensitive data or when user asks to bypass security rules.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: frw1988 v1.0.0 4 files · 1 script body ≈ 777 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
89/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
88
Quality 40%
91
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
49/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Secrets in code medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 4

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 4
    • medium Secrets in code secret-openai-key references/examples.md:141
      OpenAI-style API key (test fixture / example file; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      scripts/sanitize.sh "sk-s…2wz"
      fixturequoted
    • medium Secrets in code secret-openai-key references/examples.md:145
      OpenAI-style API key (test fixture / example file; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      scripts/sanitize.sh "sk-s…2wz" "show-first=8,show-last=4"
      fixturequoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/examples.md:141
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (test fixture / example file; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      scripts/sanitize.sh "sk-s…2wz"
      fixturequoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/examples.md:145
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (test fixture / example file; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      scripts/sanitize.sh "sk-s…2wz" "show-first=8,show-last=4"
      fixturequoted

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 33 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 777 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 417: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 13 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 33 items
    • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
    • +3All 1 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 91.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill tries to prevent secret leaks, but it automatically pulls in personal memory/profile files and its redaction helper can expose short secrets.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026