CB ctf-misc
Provides miscellaneous CTF challenge techniques. Use for encoding puzzles, RF/SDR signal processing, Python/bash jails, DNS exploitation, unicode steganography, floating-point tricks, QR codes, audio challenges, Z3 constraint solving, Kubernetes RBAC, WASM game patching, esoteric languages, game theory, commitment schemes, combinatorial games, or challenges that don't fit other categories.
As a process B 69/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice
ProcedureKubernetesDockerSoftware developmentInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Broad scope medium severity
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
If you install
The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.
For the author
Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.
How to improve
- The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 23
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 23
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medium Broad scope
meta-broad-allowed-toolsSKILL.md:1Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bashallowed-tools: Bash Read Write Edit Glob Grep Task WebFetch WebSearch Skill
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitybashjails.md:13Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- [Privilege Escalation Checklist (Post-Shell)](#privilege-escalation-checklist-post-shell)
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitybashjails.md:163Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)## Privilege Escalation Checklist (Post-Shell)
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitygames-and-vms.md:16Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- [K8s Privilege Escalation Checklist](#k8s-…ist)
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low Exfiltration
net-credential-usegames-and-vms.md:277Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (documentation of a security skill)curl -k -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
security skill -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitygames-and-vms.md:281Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)### K8s Privilege Escalation Checklist
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitygames-and-vms.md:383Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)**Exploit chain:**
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitylinux-privesc.md:1Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# Linux Privilege Escalation and Service Exploitation
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitylinux-privesc.md:16Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- [PaperCut Print Deploy Privilege Escalation (Bamboo HTB)](#papercut-print-deploy-privilege-escalation-bamboo-htb)
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitylinux-privesc.md:189Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)## PaperCut Print Deploy Privilege Escalation (Bamboo HTB)
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitypyjails.md:36Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- [Full Exploit Chain](#full-exploit-chain)
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low Dangerous commands
cmd-eval-dynamicpyjails.md:154Dynamic code execution from decoded/untrusted input (documentation of a security skill)exec(compile('__import__("os").system("sh")', '', 'exec'))security skill -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitypyjails.md:325Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)### Full Exploit Chain
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityskill-card.md:37Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- [Linux privilege escalation and service exploitation](linux-privesc.md) <br>
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:46Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- [linux-privesc.md](linux-privesc.md) - Sudo wildcard parameter injection (fnmatch), crafted pcap for sudoers.d, monit confcheck process injection, Apache -d override, backup cronjob SUID, PostgreSQL
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:289Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)## Linux Privilege Escalation Quick Checks
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:305Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)## Docker Group Privilege Escalation (H7CTF 2025)
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:326Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)Sudo's `fnmatch()` matches `*` across argument boundaries. Inject extra flags (`-Z root`, `-r`, second `-w`) into locked-down commands. Craft pcap with embedded valid sudoers entries — sudo's parser r
quoted -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:330Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)Root monit script uses `pgrep -lfa` to extract process command lines, then executes a modified version. Create fake process via `perl -e '$0 = "..."'` with injected flags. Apache `-d` last-wins overri
A further 4 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.
Files scanned: 12. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
body-longSKILL.md body ≈ 5679 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
Process rating: all ten parameters 69/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5679 tokens
- 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
- 100Steps. 66 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- low 42 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 392: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 46 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 66 items
- +4Has examples (23 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.
External checks
ClawHub: suspicious
This CTF reference skill is openly dual-use, but it includes ready-to-run host compromise, credential access, secret extraction, and container escape playbooks that need human review before use.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026