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BC feishu-cli-auth

飞书 OAuth 认证和 User Access Token 管理。两步式非交互登录（AI Agent 专用）、 Token 状态检查、scope 配置、自动刷新机制、搜索功能的 Token 依赖关系。 当用户请求"登录飞书"、"获取 Token"、"OAuth 授权"、"auth login"、"认证"、 "搜索需要什么权限"、"Token 过期了"、"刷新 Token"时使用。 当遇到权限错误（如 99991679 Unauthorized）、Token 过期、state 不匹配等问题时也应使用此技能。 也适用于：搜索命令报权限错误、Token 相关的排错、需要判断当前授权状态的场景。 当其他飞书技能（toolkit/msg/read 等）遇到 User Access Token 相关问题时，也应参考此技能。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: GISwilson v1.0.0 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 3 127 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
    allowed-tools: Bash Read

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 16 mutating operations with no state check
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 16 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3127 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 6 example trigger phrases
  • +3Description length 361: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 25 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 16 items
  • +4Has examples (14 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This Feishu auth helper is legitimate in purpose, but it defaults to broad, long-lived user permissions that exceed many likely login or search tasks.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026