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BC openclaw-aws-deploy

Deploy OpenClaw securely on AWS with a single command. Creates VPC, EC2 (ARM64), Telegram channel, and configurable AI model (Bedrock, Gemini, or any provider) — SSM-only access, no SSH. Use when setting up OpenClaw on AWS, deploying a new agent instance to EC2, or tearing down an existing AWS deployment.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Godwin Babu v1.0.0 24 files · 6 scripts body ≈ 2 464 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 61/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice

GeneratorTelegramAWSInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
89/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
87
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
61/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 6

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 6
    • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump assets/agent-defaults/HEARTBEAT.md
      Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (3) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
      assets/agent-defaults/HEARTBEAT.md, assets/agent-defaults/SOUL.md, assets/agent-defaults/USER.md
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/TROUBLESHOOTING.md:217
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      echo "GEMINI_API_KEY=your-key" | sudo tee /etc/openclaw/env
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/TROUBLESHOOTING.md:218
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      sudo chmod 600 /etc/openclaw/env
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/deploy_minimal.sh:1074
      Starts a background / autostarted process
      systemctl enable openclaw
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/smoke_test.sh:32
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (test fixture / example file)
      auth_code=$(curl -sS -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" "$ENDPOINT$AUTH_PATH" || true)
      fixture

    A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

    Files scanned: 24. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 61/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 17 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 46 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2464 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low The response is described with custom markup (3 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 306: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 33 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 46 items
    • +4Has examples (10 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
    • +3All 5 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This is a real AWS deployment helper, but it grants broad cloud authority and installs a persistent agent with proactive personal-assistant behaviors that need careful review.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 27 May 2026