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BD multi-agent

Use when requests involve writing articles, generating news, fetching hotspots, or producing content for social media (WeChat, Xiaohongshu, etc.). Triggers include "写文章", "生成新闻", "热点文章", "AI新闻", "写推文", "公众号", "小红书", "内容创作", or any article/content generation task.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: gonelake v1.0.1 MIT-0 7 files · 4 scripts body ≈ 731 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process D 45/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

GeneratorWriting and documentsAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
89/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
80
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
45/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
      Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
      allowed-tools: Bash Read

    Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "location"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 45/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (multi-agent) differs from the folder (multi-agent-writer)
    • 75Steps. 3 steps
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 731 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 263: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 11 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 3 items
    • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 80.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This writing skill is mostly transparent about its purpose, but its installer pulls mutable remote code, installs Python dependencies, and registers itself across multiple local agent environments.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026