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BD mac-disk-audit

Mac 磁盘空间盘点与清理建议技能。当用户说「硬盘不够用」「空间不足」「磁盘快满了」「帮我清理 Mac」「扫描大文件」「哪些可以删」时触发。 自动扫描系统、用户目录、开发项目中的空间占用，生成三级清理建议（立即清 / 确认后清 / 保留），提供可直接复制执行的命令。 绝不自动删除任何文件，只出报告和命令，执行前必须用户确认。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: 桂皮 v1.0.0 MIT-0 4 files body ≈ 1 218 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 20 h ago

Mac 磁盘空间盘点与清理建议技能。当用户说「硬盘不够用」「空间不足」「磁盘快满了」「帮我清理 Mac」「扫描大文件」「哪些可以删」时触发。 自动扫描系统、用户目录、开发项目中的空间占用，生成三级清理建议（立即清 / 确认后清 / 保留），提供可直接复制执行的命令。…

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerDockerSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
98
Quality 40%
70
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 2
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege skill-card.md:20
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
    Risk: Permanent-delete commands such as rm -rf or sudo rm -rf can remove files irreversibly if copied without careful review. <br>
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:203
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
    sudo rm -rf /Library/Logs/*
    security skill

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "slug"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "displayName"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "xiaping_trigger"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "xiaping_category"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "xiaping_tags"

Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 9 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1218 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 163: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 20 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 9 items
  • +4Has examples (14 code blocks)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 70.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This Mac cleanup skill is mostly purpose-aligned, but it gives risky permanent-delete commands while also making inconsistent safety promises about confirmation and Trash-based deletion.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · 21 Jun 2026