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CC accompaniment-generator

从 YouTube 或本地音频文件分离人声和伴奏，生成纯伴奏音乐。当用户需要提取伴奏、消除人声、制作卡拉OK版音频时使用。支持三种模式：(1) 歌名+歌手搜索 YouTube 下载后分离，(2) 直接提供视频 URL，(3) 处理本地音频文件。

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: GuoGe v1.0.1 MIT-0 4 files body ≈ 474 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

GeneratorYouTubeMedia and videoInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
64/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
57
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store SKILL.md:12
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    > 💡 **无需手动导出 cookies！** 脚本会自动从本地 Chrome 浏览器提取登录态。
Medium and low: 5
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/get_accompaniment.py:23
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    💡 无需手动导出 cookies！脚本会自动从本地 Chrome 浏览器提取登录态。
    quoted
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/get_accompaniment.py:129
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    cmd.extend(['--cookies-from-browser', 'chrome'])
    quoted
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/get_accompaniment.py:325
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    运行命令: yt-dlp --cookies-from-browser chrome ...
    quoted
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store SKILL.md:60
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    4. 自动通过 `--cookies-from-browser chrome` 提取浏览器登录态
    quoted
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host SKILL.md:90
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    # curl -fsSL https://deno.land/install.sh | sh

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 8 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 474 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 122: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 11 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 8 items
  • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
  • +3All 1 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill performs the advertised accompaniment generation, but it defaults to using the user's local Chrome login cookies for YouTube downloads, which needs review before installation.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026