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BC MigraQ

腾讯云迁移平台（CMG/MSP）全流程能力。触发词：资源扫描、扫描阿里云/AWS/华为云/GCP资源、生成云资源清单、选型推荐、对标腾讯云、推荐规格、帮我推荐、给我推荐、ECS对应什么腾讯云产品、成本分析、TCO、迁移报价、询价、价格计算器、cmg-scan、cmg-recommend、cmg-tco

ClawHub Agent Skills author: HaoBin v1.1.5 MIT-0 5 files body ≈ 1 252 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureAWSInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
76/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
81
Quality 40%
68
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 7

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 7
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
    allowed-tools: Read Write Bash Grep
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc SKILL.md:174
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo 'export TENCENTCLOUD_SECRET_ID="your-secret-id"' >> ~/.zshrc
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc SKILL.md:175
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo 'export TENCENTCLOUD_SECRET_KEY="your-secret-key"' >> ~/.zshrc
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc scripts/check_env.py:418
    Writes to a shell startup file (string literal in code, not executed)
    log_info('    echo \'export TENCENTCLOUD_SECRET_ID="your-secret-id"\' >> ~/.zshrc')
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc scripts/check_env.py:419
    Writes to a shell startup file (string literal in code, not executed)
    log_info('    echo \'export TENCENTCLOUD_SECRET_KEY="your-secret-key"\' >> ~/.zshrc')
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc scripts/migrateq_sse_api.py:186
    Writes to a shell startup file (string literal in code, not executed)
    '    echo \'export TENCENTCLOUD_SECRET_ID="your-secret-id"\' >> ~/.zshrc\n'
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc scripts/migrateq_sse_api.py:187
    Writes to a shell startup file (string literal in code, not executed)
    '    echo \'export TENCENTCLOUD_SECRET_KEY="your-secret-key"\' >> ~/.zshrc\n'
    code literal

Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "description_zh"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "description_en"

Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 39 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1252 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 151: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 26 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 39 items
  • +4Has examples (11 code blocks)
  • +3All 2 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 68.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
MigraQ is a disclosed Tencent Cloud migration proxy, but it can forward broad prompts to Tencent services and use local cloud credentials for real resource-changing operations with limited per-action controls.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026